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FOREWORD
"Stand Your Ground" in Context:
Race, Gender, and Politics
University of Miami Law Review
Eleventh Circuit Issue
"Stand Your Ground" Laws
PROFESSOR DONNA COKER*
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW
Florida's self-defense law, commonly known as "Stand Your
Ground" ("SYG"), has been the subject of extraordinary debate, both
popular and scholarly. SYG was the subject of hearings conducted by
the Senate Judiciary Committee, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;' the
focus of a new American Bar Association National Task Force;2 and the
topic of an investigation by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights.3 In the wake of a number of high-profile cases and following a
Tampa Bay Times award-winning study of the impact of SYG,4 Flor-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Carrie Bettinger-
L6pez, Mary Anne Franks, and Aya Gruber for their conversations and insights about SYG law. I
am deeply appreciative of the wonderful librarian assistance afforded me by Robin Schard,
Patricia Pardo, Carlos Espinosa, and Nery Ruiz, and the editing assistance of Paulina Valanty and
Kelly Heard.
1. Contributors to this issue, Ahmad Abuznaid, Caroline Bettinger-L6pez, Charlotte Cassel,
and Meena Jagannath, are members of organizations that presented testimony at many of these
hearings. See Ahmad Abuznaid et al.,"Stand Your Ground" Laws: International Human Rights
Law Implications, 68 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1129 (2014).
2. See id. at 1137.
3. See id. at 1138.
4. See Florida's Stand Your Ground Law, TAMPA BAY TDAEs, http://www.tampabay.com/
stand-your-ground-law/ (last updated Aug. 13, 2013); see also 2012 Awards, ONLINE NEWS
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ida's law and its application in the criminal cases against George Zim-
merman, Marissa Alexander, and Michael Dunn, have remained at the
top of national news programs. Despite the extraordinary attention vis-
ited SYG, there remains general confusion about the provisions of the
law and continued widespread disagreement about whether the impact of
the law is beneficial or harmful.' The articles collected in this special
issue of the University of Miami Law Review examine SYG, shedding
new light not only on the law, but also on the politics surrounding the
law, as well as the law's social meaning and impact.
Much of the national attention on SYG has focused on the absence
of a retreat rule, but this provision is hardly new or unique.6 Indeed,
several states did away with a retreat rule long before the advent of SYG
legislation.' Two other provisions of SYG law, however, are more dra-
matic departures from traditional self-defense law: (1) the provision for
immunity from arrest and prosecution for anyone who meets the stat-
ute's definition of the justifiable use of deadly force,' a right the Florida
Supreme Court has ruled requires a pre-trial hearing in which a judge
applies a preponderance of the evidence standard to a determination of
whether the defendant acted in self-defense;' and 2) the creation of a
presumption that an individual facing a kidnapper or a trespasser in a
dwelling or occupied vehicle possesses reasonable fear of death or great
bodily harm."o In addition, SYG extends the justification for the use of
Ass'N, http://journalists.orglawards/2012-awards/ (The newspaper was the recipient of the
Gannett Foundation Award for Innovative Investigative Journalism and a finalist for the Knight
Award for Public Service for its Stand Your Ground series.).
5. Press Release, Quinnipiac University, Release Detail, American Voters Back "Stand Your
Ground," Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Obama Tops Republicans on Economy
(Aug. 2, 2013), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edulimages/polling/us/us08022013.pdf
[hereinafter Quinnipiac Poll] (finding that 53% of those polled favored SYG laws; white voters
favored SYG laws 57-37% while black voters opposed SYG laws 57-37%; men supported SYG
laws 62-34%, while 44% of women favored SYG laws, and 47% of women opposed SYG laws;
Republicans supported SYG laws 75-19%, Independents supported SYG laws 57-37%, and
Democrats opposed SYG laws 62-32%).
6. See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your
Ground, 68 U. MiAMi L. REv. 961, 969 (2014).
7. Id.
8. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2013) (stating that "[a] person who uses force as permitted in
s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is ... immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for
the use of such force[,]" providing an exception in the case of the killing of a law enforcement
officer who is killed while "acting in the performance of his or her official duties[,]" and
concluding that "the term 'criminal prosecution' includes arresting, detaining in custody, and
charging or prosecuting the defendant").
9. Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456, 460 (Fla. 2010) ("[A] defendant may raise the question of
statutory immunity pretrial and, when such a claim is raised, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the immunity
attaches.").
10. See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.013 (1)-(2) (2013).
944 IVol. 68:943
FOREWORD
deadly force to the prevention of the imminent commission of a "forci-
ble felony," which includes robbery and burglary, with no requirement
that the defendant reasonably feared death or serious injury."
Few of the many commentators on SYG have noted that the enact-
ment of law that expands the rights of the criminally accused is an
anomaly in recent criminal law reform trends. The overwhelming nature
of criminal law reform in the last forty years has been to enact laws and
policies that are decidedly unfriendly to those charged with crimes. This
"tough-on-crime" trend includes the adoption of "increasingly long
prison sentences and mandatory minimums, 'three strikes' legislation
that ratchets up punishment for recidivists, increasing resort to criminal
punishment for a broad range of social ills, and aggressive drug enforce-
ment policies largely focused on racial minority neighborhoods." 2 As a
result of these "tough-on-crime" measures, the number of people in
United States prisons has experienced a six-fold increase from that of
the 1970s-the time period that marks the beginning of this trend.13 To
put this increase into perspective, consider that the United States now
leads the world in the number of people incarcerated." Further, not only
are a staggering number of people under the control of the criminal jus-
tice system, but criminal justice technologies and ideologies have largely
captured our responses to perceived threats and social ills, a phenome-
non Jonathan Simon aptly describes as "governing through crime."'
Much of the growth in crime legislation has been driven by the
image of a white suburban victim, besieged by potential criminal
11. See Threatened Use of Force, Fla. Laws ch. 2014-195 (stating that a person is justified in
the use of deadly force if he or she "reasonably believes that ... such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent
commission of a forcible felony"). The statutory definition of forcible felonies includes robbery,
burglary, arson, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and aggravated stalking, among other
crimes. See FLA. STAT. § 776.08.
12. Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg, Introduction to CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 3 (Donna
Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013).
13. Marie Gottschalk, The Past, Present, and Future of Mass Incarceration in the United
States, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 483, 483 (2011).
14. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Ninth Edition), INT'L CTR. FOR PRISON
STUDIEs (2011), available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf
(The U.S. prison population rate of 743 per 100,000 is highest among the 218 independent
countries and dependent territories included in the study, followed by Rwanda (595), Russia
(568), Georgia (547), U.S. Virgin Islands (539), and Seychelles (507).).
15. See Jonathan Simon, GovERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); see also
Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59
UCLA L. REv. 1474 (2012); Beth E. Richie, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND
AMERICA'S PRISON NATION (2012); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass
Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally about Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L.
REv. 1418 (2012); Michelle Alexander, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
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predators. 16 Only slightly less overt has been a corresponding image of
black criminality." As Lofc Wacquant describes, this image has two
primary variants: the (male) street crime image (the "thug," as Professor
D. Marvin Jones describes in this issue") and the (female) welfare cheat
image-both of whom are African-American and poor." The devastat-
ing harms of hyper-incarceration 2 0 are experienced disproportionately by
poor people and especially African-Americans and other people of color.
Though African-Americans make up about 13% of the U.S. population,
they are nearly 40% of male prisoners and 25% of female prisoners. 1
As Professors Aya Gruber and D. Marvin Jones note in this issue,
the hyper-incarceration wave is fed by a hyper-individualistic view of
culpability. As Gruber describes, this view derives from a neoliberal ide-
ology in which "the concept of individuals as autonomous economic
actors is . . . a moral paradigm." 2 2
If the general political landscape is increasing punitiveness and
resort to criminal law, how do we explain the successful adoption of a
law that makes it easier for killers to escape punishment? One response,
as Professor Elizabeth Megale forcefully argues in this issue, is to look
to the power of the National Rifle Association ("NRA"), an organization
16. See Simon, supra note 15, at 76.
17. See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet
Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1555, 1589-90, 1594 (2013) (noting that research suggests
that while intentional racial bias continues, much racial bias is unintentional and unconscious and
arguing that had race been made "salient" to the jurors in the case against Zimmerman; that is, if
jurors attention had been drawn to the racial dynamics of the case, the outcome might have been
different); see also L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion
Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REv. 293, 317 (2012). Instead, the prosecutor took the stance that race was
irrelevant to the events that caused Trayvon Martin's death. See Gruber, supra note 6, at 977.
18. See D. Marvin Jones, "He's a Black Male .. . Something Is Wrong With Him!" The Role
of Race in the Stand Your Ground Debate, 68 U. MiAmi L. REv. 1025, 1029 (2014).
19. See Lorc Wacquant, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GovERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY 81 (2009) (Both mass incarceration and welfare reform became politically popular by
proponent's projecting as their targets poor blacks who were deemed dangerous thugs (in the case
of unemployed black men), profligate, and desultory. "[U]nwed mothers . . . [were rendered]
abnormal, truncated, suspect beings who threaten the moral order and whom the state must
therefore place under [the] harsh tutelage" of welfare regulation.).
20. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyper-Incarceration as a Multidimensional Attack: Replying to
Angela Harris Through the Wire, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 67, 68-69 (2011) (describing his
preference for the term "hyper-incarceration" opposed to "mass incarceration" because the former
more accurately describes the manner in which criminalization affects particular, largely racial
minority, neighborhoods).
21. Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison & William J. Sabol, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PRoGRAMs, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2011), at 26 tbl.12, available at http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/plO.pdf.
22. See Gruber, supra note 6, at 1017; see also Jones, supra note 18, at 1037 ("While the
reasons for blacks' relatively marginalized economic status are deeply associated with structural
factors, the overwhelming mainstream view is that people become a part of this group basically
through bad choices.").
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that heavily supported the SYG law and made significant contributions
to Florida Republican legislators who sponsored the bill." Indeed, a lob-
byist for the NRA wrote portions of the legislation.24 But that seems to
beg the question: what was the NRA's message that the Florida Republi-
can-controlled legislators believed would resonate with their constitu-
ency, in a state with tough mandatory sentencing laws and one of the
highest rates of incarceration in the country? And why do recent polls
show that a majority of whites continue to support SYG laws?2 5
The answer, of course, is that SYG was not promoted as a measure
intended to make the criminal justice system more lenient, but rather as
a measure to protect "law-abiding citizens" from "criminals."2 6 Using
the same rhetoric political conservatives have used to oppose more leni-
ent criminal justice policies, an NRA lobbyist referred to SYG oppo-
nents as "bleeding heart criminal coddlers." 27 The outsourcing to private
individuals of key governmental functions-including security-is con-
sistent with the larger neoliberal trend of dismantling government and
privatizing work that was formerly controlled by government agents.
SYG provisions, including making justifiable the use of deadly force to
prevent a forcible felony,28 in effect made forcible felonies capital
crimes and encouraged private citizens to take on the role of law
enforcement agents. These provisions allow individuals to do what law
enforcement agents are constitutionally forbidden to do-use deadly
force to prevent felonies absent a justifiable threat to life or bodily
injury.2
The contributions to this special issue unpack the various meanings
of SYG legislation-not only the legal elements, but also the social and
23. See Megale, A Call for Change: A Contextual-Configurative Analysis of Florida's "Stand
Your Ground" Lows, 68 U. MiAu L. REv. 1051, 1075 (2014).
24. See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U.
MIAMi L. REv. 827, 836-39 (2013).
25. See Quinnipiac Poll, supra note 5.
26. See Megale, supra note 23, at 1077.
27. See id. at 1076 n.269.
28. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2013).
29. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Value of Life: Constitutional Limits on Citizens' Use of
Deadly Force, 21 GEo. MASON L. REv. 623, 654 (2014) (arguing that "most states have
authorizations of citizens' use of deadly force which are unconstitutionally overbroad insofar as
they include situations where the state interest involved is not sufficiently compelling to justify a
denial of the fundamental right to life"-and this is particularly the case in SYG jurisdictions). To
be sure, forcible felonies include crimes that frequently pose a risk of death or serious bodily
injury, but under Florida law (and that of a number of states), it is not necessary to prove this risk
as an independent element of self-defense. See FLA. STAT. § 776.08 (2010) (listing forcible
felonies). Furthermore, the presumption appears to be an irrebuttable one. See, e.g., Fla. S.
Judiciary Comm., Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, S. 19-CS/CS/SB 436,
Ist Reg. Sess., at 4 (Fla. 2005), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/datalsession/2005/Senate/
bills/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.ju.pdf. (interpreting the presumption as irrebuttable).
2014] 947
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political meaning of the legislation and of the stories defenders and
opponents tell. The authors' analyses of SYG and the cases that have
brought national attention to the law offer a window into the race, class,
and gender biases that operate in the criminal justice system and in soci-
ety at large. Much of the criticism of SYG law has focused on claims of
racial bias, but a strictly racial lens may hide as much as it illuminates.
Rather, as the articles in this issue illustrate, it is the intersections30 of
race, class, and gender that shape the popular image of criminality,
define the parameters of risk, and mark the disparities in arrest and
conviction.
Researchers believe that the combination of Florida's concealed
weapon law31  and SYG, is a primary reason that deaths of white
males 32-the group most likely to be killed by white male perpetra-
tors 3 3-have risen so sharply in SYG jurisdictions. This intersection
between masculinity and race tells an important part of the SYG story.
As Professor Mary Anne Franks describes in this issue, homicide is
overwhelmingly a male-on-male phenomenon, 34 and as other research
demonstrates, a significant amount of male-perpetrated homicide is a
response to a perceived threat against male honor. Furthermore,
30. See Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1245 (1991) (describing the ways
in which racial equality organizations often organize around race and make invisible the
particularized discrimination and experiences of African-American women, while feminist
organizations focus on gender and similarly fail to address the particular harms experienced by
African-American women).
31. See FLA. STAT. § 790.06 (2013).
32. See Chandler B. McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and
Injuries, 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, NBER Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8187.
33. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Expanded Homicide Table 6,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcementlexpanded-homicideexpandedhomi
cidedatatable_6_murder raceandsexofvicitm-by.race and-sex_of offender_2012.xls
(last visited Aug. 14, 2014) [hereinafter FBI Homicide Data Table 6] (finding that of the 3,128
white victims murdered in 2012, about 84% (2,614) were murdered by white offenders;
furthermore, of the 4,208 male victims murdered in 2012, 89% (3,725) were murdered by male
offenders).
34. See Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground,
Battered Women's Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1099, 1116
(2014); see also FBI Homicide Data Table 6, supra note 33 (demonstrating that of the 5,959
murders committed in 2012 for which the sex of the victim was reported, 70% were male; 89.5%
of the perpetrators were male; of the 4,208 murders of men, 88.5% were killed by men; of the
1,751 female murder victims, 91% were killed by men.).
35. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 91-92 (1992) (describing the motivations of many male
spousal killers); Angela Harris, Beyond THE MONSTER FACTORY: Gender Violence, Race, and
the Liberatory Potential of Restorative Justice, 25 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 199, 207
(2010) ("[A] significant amount of the violence addressed by the criminal justice system is
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women defendants often find it difficult to receive a fair trial in the
common circumstance in which women kill-defending against an inti-
mate or former intimate."
Supporters of SYG law argue that the law is good for women
because it empowers them to defend against stranger rape. Professor
Franks demonstrates the falseness of this claim. SYG actually "sends the
legal and social message that men can advance against strangers any-
where on the basis of vague, subjective perceptions of threats[J" while
women's use of violence continues to be discouraged and even stigma-
tized." Moreover, Professor Franks articulates, "If Stand Your Ground
reforms were in fact driven by concerns for women's vulnerability, the
paradigmatic rape scenario would have been one that most women are
likely to face: the rape by someone the victim knows and trusts," not the
stranger imagined in supporters' narratives." SYG law presumes rea-
sonable fear of death or serious bodily injury for the person who kills
someone who is engaged in an unlawful forceful entry of an occupied
vehicle or dwelling, kidnapping, or attempted kidnapping. However,
the presumption does not apply to a cohabitant attacker unless the per-
son who kills has a protection order against the attacker.40 Thus, women
'gender violence': violence motivated by the desire to protect, defend, or enhance the actor's
gender identity, typically masculinity.").
36. The difficulty has arisen, in part, because judges have been reluctant to apply well-
established law to cases involving battered women. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and
Self Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379,
393-94 (1991) (reviewing all appellate homicide cases involving a convicted female defendant for
whom evidence of domestic battering was proffered and who claimed self-defense at trial and
finding an unusually high reversal rate-most reversals were because the trial court had failed to
follow well-established self-defense law); see also V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68
U. CHI. L. REv. 1235, 1236 (2001) (providing an empirical review of imminence cases and
finding that in cases involving battered women, courts confused the (proper) question of the
imminence of the threat with the (improper) question of why the defendant had remained in an
abusive relationship, creating, in effect, an illegal "pre-confrontation retreat" rule); see generally
Donna Coker & Lindsay Harrison, The Story of Wanrow: The Reasonable Woman and the Law of
Self-Defense, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 213-62 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013)
(describing the history of feminist activism for fair trial rights for battered women who kill in self-
defense); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 33
(2000). Additionally, African-American women may be viewed by jurors as too "strong" to have
been "real" victims as are women whose conduct contradicts the passive helpless stereotype of
battered women. See Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black
Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 191, 200-01 (1991); see also Leigh Goodmark,
When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 75, 109 (2008).
37. See Franks, supra note 34, at 1103.
38. See id. at 1109.
39. See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.013(1)-(2) (2013).
40. See § 776.013 (2)(a) (2013) (providing that the presumption does not apply to cohabitants
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are unable to benefit from this presumption in the deadly force circum-
stance most commonly encountered by women: an attack from an inti-
mate cohabitant. More critically, however, the cultural stories available
to male and female defendants are markedly different. Men who defend
their "castle" against intruders with the use of deadly force are viewed as
"real men." In contrast, when women kill, the attacker is much more
likely to be an intimate rather than a stranger, and in both popular imagi-
nation and in law, "Battered Women's Syndrome remains the chief nar-
rative available to women who [defend against an intimate attacker]."41
Battered Women's Syndrome testimony is intended to assist a jury to
understand and appropriately apply a reasonableness standard to women
charged with killing an abusive intimate, but jurors may instead hear the
testimony as proof of the female defendant's pyschological dysfunc-
tion.4 2 As Professor Franks describes, "The narrative . . . is one of a
helpless woman who felt she had no choice but to use deadly force
against her abuser . . . ."' Professor Franks argues that the result is a
"two-track system of self-defense." SYG provides that those who
defend against a stranger attack may be granted immunity from prosecu-
tion, but there is no comparable immunity for women who can prove a
history of violent attacks at the hands of a husband or boyfriend against
whom they acted in self-defense. There are no comparable presump-
tions of reasonable fear when a woman faces an attacker who has com-
mitted serious bodily harm against her in the past. In fact, in cases where
a female defendant argues that she killed an abusive intimate or former
intimate partner in self-defense, courts are more likely to see vigilantism
than to see self-defense, even when the facts of self-defense would seem
abundantly clear.'
Homicide-the phenomenon, the criminal justice response, and the
social construction of the "killer"-is not only gendered, it is raced, as
well. The popularly imagined risk of homicide-of white suburban
unless there is "an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial
supervision order of no contact against that person"). This provision would seem to be superfluous
in that the presumption applies only to an unlawful entry; an entry in violation of a domestic
violence protection order would be "unlawful" and should therefore prompt the presumption, even
absent the specific statutory exception.
41. See Franks, supra note 34, at 1102.
42. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 49 (1991).
43. See Franks, supra note 34, at 1122.
44. See Maguigan, supra note 36, at 434-35. The deep irony is that the gender bias that
prompted courts and juries to see vigilantism in the cases of women who killed their abusers is the
vigilantism that SYG seems to encourage-in men.
950 [Vol. 68:943
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homeowner victims preyed upon by black stranger attackers-is a
wholly inaccurate depiction of the actual risk of homicide. Homicide is
largely an intra-race phenomenon: roughly 84% of white victims are
killed by white perpetrators, and nearly 91% of black victims are killed
by black perpetrators. 45 Black men and women are at greater risk of
becoming homicide victims than are whites.4 6 A substantial number of
homicides-nearly 43% in 2012-are committed by family members,
acquaintances, intimates, or friends of the victim-not strangers."7 Yet,
as Professor Jones describes in this issue, the cultural bias that presumes
that whites are at risk from the violent criminality of young black lower
class males is so well entrenched as to seem practically non-
controversial.48
Homicide-the phenomenon-is also classed. More than 80% of
those incarcerated in federal prison for murder have only a high school
degree or less. 49 This percentage is consistent with findings regarding
the prison population as a whole: incarcerated individuals have substan-
tially lower educational attainments than the general population.o
Available data suggests that murder may be significantly intra-class, as
well." As noted above, a significant number of murders are committed
by a person whom the victim knows well (family, neighbor, friend, inti-
mate). Furthermore, the majority of victims of violent crime are of the
45. See FBI Homicide Data Table 6, supra note 33.
46. See id.
47. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Expanded Homicide Table 10,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcementlexpanded-homicideexpandedhomi
cidedatatable 10 murderscircumstancesby_relationship-.2012.xls (last visited Aug. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter FBI Homicide Data Table 10].
48. See Jones, supra note 18, at 1029.
49. See Offenders Sentenced in U.S. District Courts Under the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Guidelines, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edul
sourcebook/pdf/t5282010.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) (providing that 37.9% of those
incarcerated for murder had achieved less than a high school education; 47% had achieved a high
school education).
50. See Caroline Wolf Harlow, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2003), available at https://youthbuild.org/sites/default/files/news/
2012/08/3022/ecp.pdf (About 40% of state prison inmates and about 27% of federal inmates did
not complete high school, compared to 18% of the general population. Furthermore, far fewer
incarcerated individuals complete any college training: about I1% of state inmates and about 24%
of federal inmates completed some college, compared to 48% of the general population.
Moreover, most prisoners were classified in the lowest income levels prior to incarceration.); see
also James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 55 (citing
research that finds that "the majority of prisoners in state facilities earned less than $10,000 in the
year before entering prison").
51. See, e.g., FBI Homicide Data Table 10, supra note 47 (finding that in 2012, about 43% of
all homicides were committed against family members, acquaintances, intimates, friends, or
neighbors of the perpetrator, and another .07% were "gang-related").
2014] 951
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same or similar socio-economic class as are the majority of those
incarcerated.52
If the phenomenon of violent crime is "classed," surely the social
construction of criminality is more so. Professor Jones calls attention to
the intersections of gender, race, class, and youth in the popular imagi-
nation of the "thug," which he argues is evidenced in George Zimmer-
man's assessment of Trayvon Martin and is perpetuated by
Zimmerman's supporters. Jones deftly demonstrates that the identity
ascribed to young Trayvon Martin by Zimmerman's supporters-and
Zimmerman-is an intersectional identity defined by race (black), age
(youth), gender (male), and class (poor): "[t]he same moral panic, which
once targeted all blacks, has refocused on black males in urban areas
with saggy pants and hoodies," 3 images that are "deeply associated with
criminals and crime." 54 The references in the blogosphere to Trayvon as
a "thug, vandal, burglar, pothead and/or drug dealer" illustrate this
widely held association.
Professor Jones traces the development of this "urban thug" stereo-
type, a "pathological form of masculinity," to a combination of eco-
nomic conditions and media-propelled images." De-industrialization
resulted in the hollowing out of urban areas, creating "moonscapes of
despair [that] led to the rise of a black underclass,"" while hyper-segre-
gation concentrated black poor in urban neighborhoods. Popular media
created a stereotype of the 'black underclass' as "a dangerous class ...
pervasively comprised of a criminal element, unreachable and incorrigi-
52. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Crime Victimization in the
United States, 2008, at Table 14, available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus/current/
cv0814.pdf or http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus08.pdf (in 2008, 44% of all personal
crimes were perpetrated against victims with household incomes of $7,500 or less; 41.3% were
perpetrated against victims with household incomes of $7,500-$14,999).
53. See Jones, supra note 18, at 1028; see also Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender,
and the Law: Three Approaches, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 42 (2009) ("Class prejudice in
the United States is intertwined with race. The pejorative term 'trailer trash,' . . . is used to express
contempt for lower-class white people, and is especially applied to poor white people from the
South. Anti-black prejudice overlaps substantially with class prejudice; when middle-class black
people are praised by whites for being 'articulate,' it reflects the prejudice that most black people
are not capable of speaking in Standard English, and more broadly, are ignorant and uneducated,
as poor people are presumed to be.").
54. See Jones, supra note 18, at 1029.
55. See id. at 1032 (quoting Nicholas Stix, Another "Honor Student": Trayvon Martin Was a
Thug, Vandal, Burglar, Pothead and/or Drug Dealer and Had Been Suspended from School at
Least 3 Times, Nicholas Stix, Uncensored (Mar. 28 2012, 3:09 AM), http://
nicholasstixuncensored.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-honor-student-trayvon-martin.html).
56. See Jones, supra note 18, at 1040.
57. See id. at 1036.
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ble."5 8 In this context, race becomes evidence of criminality: "What
makes Zimmerman's assumptions about race particularly dangerous is
the fact that Zimmerman is expressing racism . . . as a claim of knowl-
edge."" The claim is that racial profiling is reasonable-reflecting an
accurate assessments of risk, and is therefore devoid of racial hatred or
emotion." However, as Professor Jones describes, this "common knowl-
edge" cannot be true.6 1 Blacks who are arrested for violent crimes make
up only about one half of one percent of the entire United States black
population.62 Even if one were to narrow suspicion to black urban males,
the number arrested for violent crimes would be less than one percent of
the group.63 Furthermore, more whites are arrested for violent crimes
than are blacks; thus, an individual is statistically more likely to be vic-
timized by a white person than a black person."
Yet race, in conjunction with appearing "out of place," is enough to
arouse suspicion of criminality, not only for neighborhood watch cap-
tains like George Zimmerman, but also for law enforcement, and for
much of our society, as well. Professor Jones concludes that our public
discourse "has been deeply pervaded by illicit linkages between race and
crime, between strangers and outsiders and between 'urban poor' and
'visibly lawless people.' "65
Ahmad Abuznaid and his co-authors66 argue that it is precisely the
bias attached to these intersections of race, youth, and gender that render
SYG laws discriminatory and in violation of international human rights.
The authors argue that SYG legislation worsens longstanding problems
of "racial, age, and gender biases"6" both in the perpetration of violence
and in the legal response to violence: "SYG laws have shifted attitudes
amongst law enforcement, jurors and the general public about self-
defense" and "play[] a role in sanctioning and crystallizing the right of
58. See id. at 1037.
59. See id. at 1029.
60. See id. at 1030.
61. See id. at 1043.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1044.
64. See id. at 1042.
65. See id. at 1049-50.
66. The co-authors of this article work with a number of organizations-Dream Defenders,
University of Miami School of Law Human Rights Clinic, and Florida Legal Services Community
Justice Project-who collectively prepared testimony on SYG for the United Nations Human
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
67. See Abuznaid et al., supra note 1, at 1132.
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people to act on subjective fears based on racist stereotypes."68 The
authors compare the outcomes of the Zimmerman, Dunn, and Alexander
cases. Marissa Alexander was convicted of aggravated assault for alleg-
edly firing a shot towards her husband and his two young sons.69 She
fired a single gun shot that left a bullet embedded in a wall.70 Alexander
and one eyewitness and alleged victim of her assault, the older son of
her estranged husband, testified that she did not aim the gun at anyone."
Alexander testified that she fired up towards the ceiling72 to defend her-
self against her husband's threats to kill her. 3 The jury heard several
witnesses testify that Rico Gray had abused Alexander in the past.74
What the jury did not know was that Alexander had obtained a domes-
tic violence injunction order against Gray that was no longer in effect at
the time of the shooting." Gray's deposition testimony agreed with
Alexander's claims: he threatened her and she was defending herself.
However, at trial, Gray recanted, insisted that he had not harmed or
threatened Alexander on the day of the shooting, and explained that he
lied in his deposition testimony to protect Alexander." The trial testi-
mony of Gray's younger son, who was also a witness to the shooting and
an alleged victim, supported Gray's trial version of events." The jury
found Alexander guilty of three counts of aggravated assault-one each
68. See id. at 1143, 1145.
69. See Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Alexander's
conviction was overturned because the jury instruction improperly suggested to the jury that
Alexander had the burden to prove self-defense. Id. at 1188. Alexander now faces a new trial.
70. See id. at 1187.
71. See id. (Alexander testified that she shot "into the air"); see Trial Tr., 308, Mar. 15, 2012
(Rico, Jr. testified that Alexander pointed the gun up rather than at anyone, but that he left the
room before the gun was fired.). In response to criticisms of the handling of the Alexander case,
the Florida legislature passed legislation in the summer of 2014 that amends SYG law in two
regards. First, the new law clarified that the threat to use force is justifiable under the same
circumstances as would apply to the actual use of force. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2014). Second,
the new law provides an exception to the application of the mandatory minimum sentence for
aggravated assault for a defendant who "had a good faith belief that the aggravated assault was
justifiable [under SYG law]," who was not committing a crime at the time of the assault, and
whom the court finds "does not pose a threat to public safety" and where "the totality of the
circumstances involved in the offense do not justify the imposition of such sentence." FLA. STAT.
§§ 775.087(6)(a), (b)-(c) (2014). It is not yet clear what impact the new law will have on the
upcoming Alexander trial.
72. See Alexander, 121 So. 3d at 1187.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id. Had the no-contact provisions of Alexander's domestic violence injunction been
current, she would have received the benefit of a presumption of reasonableness under the SYG
law. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2)(a) (2013).
76. See Gray Dep. 16:22-16:23, Nov. 22, 2010.
77. See Trial Tr., 50, Mar. 15, 2012.
78. See id. at 112 (Pemell Gray testified that Alexander pointed the gun "forward" towards
him, his father, and his brother.).
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for Gray and his two sons. 7 9 Now compare the Alexander case with the
Zimmerman and Dunn cases. Zimmerman saw a young African-Ameri-
can teenager walking through his neighborhood.s0 He deemed him sus-
picious and contacted the police." The dispatcher advised him not to
pursue the teenager, but Zimmerman disregarded this warning and set
out on foot to follow the youth.82 Zimmerman claims that the young
man attacked him, forcing Zimmerman to use deadly force to defend
himself. 3 The jury acquitted Zimmerman of second-degree murder.84
Michael Dunn, sitting at a service station, was annoyed by the loud
music coming from a vehicle occupied by several African-American
boys." An altercation ensued." Dunn testified that he thought one of the
boys was pointing a gun at him, but no weapon was found at the scene
and Dunn's girlfriend, who was with him at the time of the shooting,
testified that Dunn never mentioned that the boy had threatened him
with a gun." Dunn shot and killed Jordan Davis, a young man in the
car." The jury found Dunn guilty of three counts of attempted second-
degree murder and one count of discharging a firearm into a vehicle but
was unable to come to a verdict regarding the first-degree murder
charge.
In Florida, the prosecution has the burden of disproving self-
defense. 90 If there is reasonable doubt that Zimmerman was guilty of
79. See State v. Alexander, 2012 WL 10738699 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2012).
80. See Transcript of George Zimmerman's Call to Police, MOTHER JONES, http://www.
motherjones.com/documents/326700-full-transcript-zimmerman (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).
81. See id.
82. See id. Alafair Burke argues that had the court granted the prosecution's request for a first
aggressor instruction, the trial outcome might have been different. See Alafair Burke, What You
May Not Know About the Zimmerman Verdict: The Evolution of a Jury Instruction, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 15, 2013, 11:19 AM), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alafair-burke/
george-zimmerman-jury-instructions_b_3596685.html. See also FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2013)
("The justification described in the preceding sections ... is not available to a person who ... (2)
[ilnitially provokes the use of force against himself . . . .").
83. See Trymaine Lee, George Zimmerman Evidence Shows Extent to Which Police Doubted
Self-Defense Claim, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2012, 5:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/06/26/george-zimmerman-evidence-police-doubt-self-defense n_1628209.html.
84. See Arian Campo-Flores & Lynn Waddell, Jury Acquits Zimmerman of All Charges,
WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.comlnews/articles/SBl00014241278873248795045786035627620
64502 (last updated July 14, 2013).
85. See Greg Botelho, Steve Almasy & Sunny Hostin, Dunn Convicted on Attempted Murder;
Hung Jury on Murder in "Loud Music" Trial, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/16/justice/
florida-loud-music-triall (last updated Feb. 17, 2014).
86. See id.
87. See Lizette Alvarez, Florida Man's Fiancee Contradicts Parts of His Testimony in Killing
of Teenager, N.Y. TiMEs (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/florida-mans-
fiancee-contradicts-parts-of-his-testimony-in-killing-of-teenager.html?_r-0.
88. See id.
89. See Botelho et al., supra note 85.
90. See Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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murder, and insufficient evidence for a jury to reach a verdict of murder
in the Dunn case, how could there not be reasonable doubt in the far
weaker case against Alexander? How is it possible that prosecutor
Angela Corey, who prosecuted all three cases, failed to gain convictions
in the Zimmerman and Dunn cases, despite overwhelming evidence of
guilt, but was successful in gaining a conviction in the far more factually
dubious case of Alexander? Abuznaid and his co-authors argue that the
differences in outcomes in these three cases demonstrate that "race and
gender are determinants of 'who is granted the right to defend their lives
and who is constructed as an object of fear."'' They conclude that SYG
laws offend United States international human rights obligations includ-
ing the right to life-a right incorporated into every major international
human rights instrument-and the right to equality and freedom from
discrimination. 92
Professor Aya Gruber reminds us that the problems of racial and
gender bias in the criminal justice system are more commonly problems
of the bias of state actors against defendants, rather than the bias of
private citizens against private citizens.9 3 Professor Gruber notes that
progressives generally have been critical of the "tough-on-crime"
approaches that have resulted in hyper-incarceration, long prison
sentences, and punitive-rather than preventative or rehabilitative-
approaches to crime.9 4 Why then, in the controversy surrounding SYG,
are progressives arguing for law reform that will make it more difficult,
not less, for a defendant to argue self-defense?
In the early days following the death of Trayvon Martin, commen-
tary focused on "neighborhood warriors, racial profiling, and especially
the racially discriminatory nature of police and prosecutorial discre-
tion."9 5 The recurring question was "if the races were reversed, would
91. See Abuznaid et al., supra note 1, at 1047 (quoting Free Marissa Now! Talking Points,
FREE MARISSA Now! COALITION (Aug. 6, 2013), http://tiny.cc/fmntalkingpoints [hereinafter FMN
Talking Points]; Written Statement on Domestic Violence, Gun Violence, and "Stand Your
Ground" Laws, Submitted by The Advocates for Human Rights, University of Miami School of
Law Human Rights Clinic, Legal Momentum, and Women Enabled (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.law.miami.edulhuman-rights-clinic/pdf/2013/ICCPR-Shadow-Report-Domestic-
Violence.pdf).
92. See Abuznaid et al., supra note 1, at 1170.
93. See Gruber, supra note 6, at 965.
94. See id. at 1003.
95. See id. at 964 (citing Monique 0. Madan, Shooting Mystery: Miami-Dade Teen Killed by
a Crime Watch Captain, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.husd.org/cmsIlib07/
AZ01001450/Centricity/Domain/2090/3-9%20Martin%2OShot.pdf (reporting that Martin's
mother objected to the police's reluctance to prosecute and noting that the Martins' attorney,
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police have made an arrest?" 96 However, this focus soon turned to a
focus on the problems of SYG law: it was the problematic law that
forced the police to initially decline to arrest Zimmerman; it was the law
that made it difficult for the prosecutor to secure a conviction. The turn
to a focus on the problems of SYG law took the place of more systemic
critiques of the ways in which racism infuses public perceptions of
crime and risk and influences decision-making by law enforcement and
prosecutors, "render[ing] the Zimmerman saga largely a cautionary tale
about overly lenient, 'pro-violence' criminal policies, rather than an
expos6 of rampant racial hierarchy in the administration of justice and
society in general."" Gruber insightfully writes, "Imagine . . . if the
legacy of the [Emmett] Till tragedy were a set of arguments for mandat-
ing the death penalty, restricting jury and grand jury rights, and temper-
ing double jeopardy, because these doctrines contributed to the killers
Bryant and Milam's ability to avoid punishment.""
A focus on SYG law fails to capture the ways in which neighbor-
hood watch organizations, of which Zimmerman was a member, fre-
quently promote racialized views of "neighborhoods as fortified castles
to be defended from outside invaders[,]"" creating "racial border
patrols." 00 A focus on SYG law also deflects attention from the evi-
dence of longstanding racial bias of the police department. A focus on
Zimmerman's individual violence, displaces a focus on the more routine
violence perpetrated by police against innocent men of color.
The result of this turn to a focus on the elements of SYG law is that
"[t]he idea now ingrained in the minds of many racial justice-seekers is
that only by narrowing the definition of self-defense (and thereby gener-
ally strengthening murder law) can we ensure Trayvon's death was not
in vain."o Professor Gruber sees this "turn" as evidence of the ubiquity
of the "punitive impulse," an impulse that "manifests as intuition that
the best course of action is one that severely punishes the harm-doer."102
The punitive impulse stems from tough-on-crime ideology that arises
Benjamin Crump, stated that "the neighborhood watch was supposed to protect him, not kill him"
and opined that Martin was racially profiled)).
96. See id. (citing Mike Schneider, Parents of Slain Black Teen Want FBI Investigation,
CHARLESTON GAzETTE, Mar. 17, 2012, at 8C (stating that the parents of Trayvon Martin argued
that Sanford police failed to arrest "Zimmerman because he is white and their son was black")).
97. See id. at 1021.
98. See id. at 979.
99. See id. at 982.
100. See id. at 985.
101. See id. at 963. Professor Gruber also notes that it is particularly inappropriate to focus on
the elements of SYG law in discussions of the Zimmerman case because the controversial
elements of the law seem to have had no bearing on the outcome. See id. at 977. Based on juror
interviews, jurors did not believe that Zimmerman could have retreated. See id.
102. See id. at 1019.
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from a "neoliberal vision of individuals and society" in which "there is
no society, and central government is . . . illegitimate; thus, grievous
harm and suffering [are not the] .. . product of poor social arrangement
or ineffective governing[,]" but are instead the fault of "abnormal, yet
fully morally culpable, individual actors."os
Professor Gruber concludes that "when progressives critically ana-
lyze the equities of a certain shift in criminal law, they [should] do so
with the assumption that greater severity in criminal law adds to the
problems of mass incarceration and racialized policing and thus with a
presumption against greater severity . . .
Professor Elizabeth Megale draws our attention to the political and
moral climate surrounding the enactment of Florida's SYG law. Using a
jurisprudential framework developed by Myres McDougal and Harold
Laswell, Professor Megale examines the process by which SYG was
enacted.10 ' Before beginning her process analysis, however, Professor
Megale first underscores the ways in which SYG is a gross departure
from not only prior self-defense law, but also from the general norms of
criminal jurisprudence. 10 6 She notes that the normal process of determin-
ing guilt requires a finding of probable cause, a prosecutorial decision
whether justice is served by prosecution, a trial or plea agreement, a
verdict if the defendant opts for a trial, and the imposition of a sentence
by a judge if the defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty.107 However,
SYG law "has turned this system on its head,"10 effectively ceding con-
trol to private citizens.
Returning to the question of the political and moral context in
which the law was enacted, Professor Megale first describes the
extraordinary influence of the NRA and the American Legislative
Exchange Council ("ALEC"), of which the NRA is a member, in the
development and passage of SYG. 109 As mentioned previously, Marion
Hammer, former president of the NRA, drafted key parts of the law.'
Professor Megale argues that the NRA's power over legislators arises
103. See id. at 1018.
104. See id. at 1006-07.
105. See Megale, supra note 23, at 1053-54.
106. See id. at 1070-71.
107. See id. at 1078.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1081.
110. See id. at 1082 (citing Adam Weinstein, How the NRA and its Allies Helped Spread a
Radical Gun Law Nationwide, MOT-HER JONEs (June 7, 2012, 3:10 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/nra-alec-stand-your-ground). Furthermore, ALEC's
corporate membership works closely with state legislators to create and pass legislation. See id. at
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from two sources: (1) the organization's ability to make financial contri-
butions to the political campaigns of individual legislators and to the
Republican party; and (2) the organization's ability to "deliver elections
by creating and then directing large blocs of single-issue voters.""
Furthermore, the most "troubling aspect of the NRA's legislative influ-
ence is the fact that it does not necessarily represent the values held by
the majority of the community.""' Only 500,000 of Florida's residents
are NRA members-a number that is less than three percent of Florida's
citizens.' 1 3 Even if one were to expand the community of interest to
include all gun owners, the number, 800,000, would remain a small per-
centage of the state's population.' 14 Though opposition to the law has
increased following the Zimmerman case, Professor Megale argues that
the continued influence of the NRA has blocked legislative considera-
tion of its repeal. 1 5 The primary opponents of SYG-gun control advo-
cates and law enforcement-are woefully underfunded compared to the
NRA, have no corporate sponsorship equivalent to that of ALEC, and
have wanted in terms of winning strategies." 6 McDougal and Laswell
define law as "'a process of authoritative decision by which the mem-
bers of a community clarify and implement their common interests.' "117
Megale's analysis would suggest that SYG fails this test."'
1081. While ALEC represents itself as non-partisan, "only one of 104 participating legislators is a
Democrat." See id
111. See id. at 1082 (citing Scott Medlock, NRA =No Rational Argument? How the National
Rifle Association Exploits Public Irrationality, 11 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 39, 42 (2005)).
112. See id. at 1083.
113. See id. (citing Dara Kam, How the NRA Attained Dominance in the "Gunshine State",
PALM BEACH PosT (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/crime-law/how-
the-nra-attained-doniinance-in-the-gunshine-sta/nN2yY/ (Florida has approximately 900,000 gun
owners, but approximately 100,000 reside out-of-state)).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1084 (citing Joe Saunders, Fla. House Committee Rejects "Stand Your Ground"
Repeal Effort, BIZPAc REVIEW (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.bizpacreview.com/2013/11/08/fla-
house-committee-rejects-stand-your-ground-repeal-effort-86732; Marion P. Hammer, ALERT!
Florida's Stand Your Ground Law Stood Its Ground Against Attack, NRA-ILA (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2013/1 1/alert!-floridas-stand-your-ground-law-
stood-its-ground-against-attack.aspx).
116. See id. at 1085. Gun control lobbyists were given inadequate time to mount a defense
when the legislation was passed. See id. (citing Daniel Michael, Florida's Protection of Persons
Bill, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 199, 200 (2006)). They continue to use an education model, which
Megale argues is ineffective. See id.
117. See id. at 1061 (quoting HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYERs S. McDouGAL, Preface to
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SocIrY, at xxx (1992)).
118. See id. at 1097.
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